Wisconsin State Public Defender
Brief Bank
Civil Commitments


Mental Health Act (Ch. 51)/Protective Services (Ch. 55)
In the Matter of the Guardianship of Robert O.O.:
County of Pepin v. Robert O.O., 98-0824
I. ROBERT O. WAS DENIED THE STATUTORY RIGHT TO A TWELVE PERSON JURY PURSUANT TO § 756.06(2)(B), STATS., BECAUSE THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM, IN EXERCISING HIS DUTY TO ADVISE ROBERT O. OF HIS RIGHTS, NEGLECTED TO ADVISE HIM OF THE RIGHT TO A TWELVE PERSON JURY, BUT RATHER, SPECIFICALLY ADVISED ROBERT O. THAT HE HAD THE RIGHT TO A SIX PERSON JURY.
II. THE TRIAL COURT EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY IN CONCLUDING THAT ROBERT O. WAS NOT COMPETENT TO REFUSE PSYCHOTROPIC MEDICATION BECAUSE THE PETITION FOR GUARDIAN-SHIP DID NOT CONTAIN THE REQUISITE ALLEGATION OF INCOMPETENCY, AND THE RECORD IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE FINDINGS NECESSARY TO SUPPORT THE COURT'S CONCLUSION.
III. THE RECORD IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT ROBERT O. IS NOT COMPETENT TO EXERCISE THE RIGHT TO VOTE.
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State v. Belinda J.P., 98-0376-CR
THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE BELINDA J.P. WAS INCOMPENT TO REFUSE MEDICATION.
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In the Matter of Gregory R., Alleged to be Mentally Ill:
Dane County v. Gregory R., 98-1488
I. THE COUNTY FAILED TO PROVE BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT GREGORY R. WAS A DANGER TO HIMSELF OR OTHERS.
II. GREGORY R. SHOULD BE GRANTED A NEW COMMITMENT HEARING AS HE WAS ARBITRARILY DENIED HIS STATUTORY RIGHT TO A FOURTH PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE.
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In the Matter of Carolyn L.C., Alleged Mentally Ill:
State v. Carolyn L.C., 99-1715
THE COMMITMENT MUST BE VACATED BECAUSE THE COUNTY FAILED TO PROVE CAROLYN L.C. IS A DANGER TO HERSELF.
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In the Matter of the Mental Commitment of Andrew C.H.:
Sheboygan County v. Andrew C.H., 99-2743-FT
THE COUNTY FAILED TO PRODUCE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION THAT THERE WAS A SUBSTANTIAL LIKELIHOOD, BASED ON ANDREW'S TREATMENT RECORD, THAT HE WOULD BE A PROPER SUBJECT FOR COMMITMENT IF TREATMENT WERE WITHDRAWN.
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In The Matter of the Mental Commitment of Joanne C.:
Marinette County v. Joanne C., 96-1047
I. THE TRIAL COURT LOST COMPETENCY TO PROCEED WHEN IT FAILED TO HOLD THE FINAL COMMITMENT HEARING WITHIN 14 DAYS FROM JOANNE C.'S FILING OF THE JURY DEMAND.
II. JOANNE C. DID NOT KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY WAIVE HER RIGHT TO COUNSEL WHEN, ON THE MORNING OF TRIAL, SHE SAID SHE WOULD HAVE TO REPRESENT HERSELF IF THE COURT WOULD NOT APPOINT NEW COUNSEL TO REPRESENT HER.
III. THE FORM OF THE JURY VERDICT, WHICH PRESENTED MORE THAN ONE GROUND FOR COMMITMENT IN A SINGLE QUESTION, DENIED JOANNE C. HER RIGHT TO A VERDICT BY 5/6THS OF THE JURY.
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In the Matter of the Mental Commitment of Joyce A.R.:
State of Wisconsin v. Joyce A.R., 99-0953-FT
I. THE EVIDENCE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT AND JUDGMENT THAT JOYCE WAS DANGEROUS TO ANOTHER.
II. THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT JOYCE WAS INCOMPETENT TO REFUSE MEDICATION.
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In the Matter of: Verda C.R., Alleged to be Mentally Ill;
Sauk County v. Verda C.R., 97-3489
VERDA C.R.'S SINGLE ACT OF THROWING AWAY THE BELONGINGS IN HER APARTMENT WAS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE THAT SHE WAS A DANGER TO HERSELF OR OTHERS, WARRANTING INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT.
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In The Matter Of The Mental Commitment Of Misty K.:
Lincoln County V. Misty K., 00-0006
I. MISTY K. WAS DENIED HER RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL WHEN THE GOVERNMENT ELICITED TESTIMONY FROM A CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST INDICATING THAT "WITHIN A WEEK OR SO" MISTY K. COULD BE STABILIZED ON MEDICATIONS AND MOVED BACK HOME.
II. MISTY K. WAS DENIED HER RIGHT TO A FIVE-SIXTH VERDICT WHEN THE COURT, AT THE GOVERNMENT'S REQUEST, INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON SEVERAL ALTERNATIVE STATUTORY THEORIES OF DANGEROUSNESS, BUT DID NOT REQUIRE AT LEAST FIVE MEMBERS OF THE JURY TO AGREE ON A PARTICULAR THEORY OF DANGEROUSNESS BEFORE RETURNING A VERDICT.
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In the Matter of the Mental Commitment of Hilbert Randy S.: Marathon County v. Hilbert Randy S., 00-2786-FT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO ALLOW HILBERT TO QUESTION DR. GALLI ABOUT DANGEROUSNESS BECAUSE WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(AM) REQUIRES THE COURT TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE PATIENT WOULD BECOME DANGEROUS WITHOUT TREATMENT.
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NGRI
State v. Blodgett, 98-2469-CR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THE STATE HAD PROVED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE NGI DEFENDANT SHOULD BE COMMITTED TO MENDOTA RATHER THAN BE CONDITIONALLY RELEASED.
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Sexually Violent Persons (Ch. 980)
In re the Commitment of Peter Kienitz:
State v. Kienitz, 97-1460, 227 Wis. 2d 423 (1999)
I. WITHOUT A REASONABLY PRECISE LIMITING CONSTRUCTION, THE TERM "SUBSTANTIALLY PROBABLE" IN CHAPTER 980 IS UNCONSTITUT-IONALLY VAGUE AND VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROCESS.
II. WITHOUT "EXTREMELY LIKELY" AS THE DEFINITION OF "SUBSTANTIALLY PROBABLE," CHAPTER 980 VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE UNITED STATES AND WISCONSIN CONSTITUTIONS.
III. THE COURT SHOULD DEFER TO THE CIRCUIT COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT, BUT APPLY DE NOVO REVIEW TO THE APPLICATION OF THE CHAPTER 980 DANGEROUSNESS STANDARD TO THOSE FACTS.
IV. A DETERMINATION OF DANGEROUS-NESS UNDER CHAPTER 980 MUST BE SUPPORTED BY EXPERT TESTIMONY, AND BECAUSE THE ONLY EXPERT FOUND RELIABLE BY THE CIRCUIT COURT TESTIFIED THAT MR. KIENITZ WAS NOT SUBSTANTIALLY PROBABLE TO REOFFEND, THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO COMMIT HIM.
V. REGARDLESS OF THE NEED FOR EXPERT TESTIMONY, THE EVIDENCE RELIED UPON BY THE CIRCUIT COURT WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH A SUBSTANTIAL PROBABILITY OF RE-OFFENSE.
VI. IF THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT, THE DANGEROUSNESS STANDARD IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE SHOWED MR. KIENITZ HAS LESS THAN A FIFTY PERCENT CHANCE OF REOFFENDING.
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In re the Commitment of Dennis R. Thiel:
State v. Thiel, 99-0316, ___ Wis. 2d ___ ( )
I. THE STATE WAS REQUIRED TO PROVE AT TRIAL THAT THE APPELLANT WAS WITHIN 90 DAYS OF HIS RELEASE OR DISCHARGE AS ALLEGED PURSUANT TO WIS. STAT. § 980.02(2).
II. THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE THAT THIEL WAS WITHIN 90 DAYS OF HIS RELEASE FROM
III. THE RESPONDENT DID NOT WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO OBJECT TO THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE BY RAISING HIS OBJECTION FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.
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In re the Commitment of Wilbert L. Thomas
State v. Thomas, 98-0152, ___ Wis. 2d ___ ( )
THE RACINE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY DOES NOT HAVE PLENARY AUTHORITY TO FILE A PETITION FOR COMMITMENT UNDER CHAP. 980, STATS. THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S AUTHORITY IS LIMITED TO THOSE CASES IN WHICH THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS HAS CERTIFIED AN INDIVIDUAL AS ELIGIBLE FOR CHAP. 980 PROCEEDINGS, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DECLINES TO FILE THE PETITION FOR COMMITMENT.
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In re the Commitment of Frederick J. Brissette:
State v. Brissette, 98-2152, 230 Wis.2d 82 (1999)
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED BRISSETTE'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE PETITION ON ACCOUNT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO HOLD A TIMELY PROBABLE CAUSE HEARING.
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In re the Commitment of Kerby G. Denman:
State v. Denman, 99-1829
I. THE STATE'S PROOF WAS DEFICIENT BECAUSE IT FAILED TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT, AS REQUIRED BY WIS. STAT. §§ 980.02(2)(AG) AND 980.05(3)(A), THAT THE APPELLANT WAS WITHIN 90 DAYS OF DISCHARGE OR RELEASE.
II. THE APPELLANT'S WAIVER OF A JURY TRIAL WAS INVALID BECAUSE HE WAS NOT ADVISED THAT THE JURY'S VERDICT HAD TO BE UNANIMOUS.
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In re the Commitment of Mervel L. Eagans, Jr.:
State v. Eagans, 97-2508, 98-0837
I. CHAPTER 980, STATS., IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED WHERE A PERSON WHOSE OFFENSES QUALIFYING HIM TO BE A SEXUALLY VIOLENT PERSON WERE COMMITTED AS A JUVENILE AND THERE IS NO DEFINITIVE EVIDENCE THAT PERSONS WHO SEXUALLY OFFEND AS A JUVENILE ARE SUBSTANTIALLY PROBABLE TO OFFEND AS AN ADULT.
II. CHAPTER 980 CANNOT CONSTITUTIONALLY BE APPLIED TO PERSONS CLAIMED TO BE SEXUALLY VIOLENT DUE TO SEX OFFENSES COMMITTED AS JUVENILES WHEN THERE ARE NO RECOGNIZED STANDARDS APPLICABLE UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES.
III. AN ANTISOCIAL PERSONALITY DISORDER ALONE IS NOT A SUFFICIENTLY PRECISE CATEGORY FOR A PERSON TO BE SUBJECT TO A CH. 980 COMMITMENT.
IV. THE TERM "SUBSTANTIALLY PROBABLE" IS IMPERMISSIBLY VAGUE AS APPLIED TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF SEXUAL REOFFENSE UNDER SEC. 980.01(7), STATS., WHICH PREJUDICED MERVEL EAGANS, JR., BY NOT BEING RAISED IN THIS CASE AS A MATTER OF DUE PROCESS.
V. TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO RAISE AN EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE TO THE MEANING OF THE TERM "SUBSTANTIALLY PROBABLE."
VI. CHAPTER 980 STATS., WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED IN VIOLATION OF THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSES OF THE STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS FOR PERMITTING AN ADULT PROSECUTION FOR A SEX OFFENSE COMMITTED AS A JUVENILE THAT DOES NOT HAVE THE NECESSARY NEXUS TO THE PURPOSES OF THE LEGISLATION.
VII. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO PROPERLY INVESTIGATE AND PRESENT INFORMATION FROM THE LITERATURE TO CHALLENGE THE METHODOLOGY AND IMPEACH THE CREDIBILITY OF THE STATE'S WITNESSES RELATING TO A PERSON WHO SEXUALLY OFFENDED AS A JUVENILE BUT WAS PROSECUTED AS AN ADULT.
VIII. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO CHALLENGE CH. 980 AS PUNITIVE FOR FAILING TO PROVIDE RELEASE PROVISIONS CONSISTENT WITH OTHER CIVIL COMMITTEES.
IX. A NEW TRIAL SHOULD BE GRANTED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE ON THE BASIS THE REAL ISSUE WAS NOT FULLY TRIED.
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In re the Commitment of Nathan Lalor:
State v. Lalor, 99-0957
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO EXCUSE JUROR GORDON NELSON FOR CAUSE WHEN NELSON COULD NOT UNEQUIVOCALLY COMMIT TO BEING FAIR AND IMPARTIAL, THEREBY CAUSING THE DEFENDANT TO EXERCISE A PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE OF THE JUROR, AND DEPRIVING THE DEFENDANT OF HIS FULL NUMBER OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING, OVER OBJECTION, EVIDENCE BY DR. DOREN RELATING TO DISPOSITION TO THE EFFECT THAT RESPONDENT WOULD NOT BE SUPERVISED IF RELEASE, AN ERROR COMPOUNDED WHEN THE COURT REFUSED TO ANSWER A JURY QUESTION ABOUT THE CONSE-QUENCES OF BEING A SEXUALLY VIOLENT PERSON.
III. DR. HAGAN'S DEFINITION OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE TO INCLUDE PSYCHOLOG-ICAL VIOLENCE AND THIRD?DEGREE SEXUAL ASSAULT INCONSISTENT WITH THE STATUTORY DEFINITIONS IN WIS. STAT. § 980.01(2), (6) AND (7), CONSTITUTED AN ERRONEOUS UNDERSTANDING OF THE LAW AND CANNOT SUPPORT ANY FINDING NATHAN LALOR IS A SEXUALLY VIOLENT PERSON.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED RE-VERSIBLE ERROR BY ERRONEOUSLY ADMITTING EXTREMELY PREJUDICIAL OTHER?ACTS EVIDENCE INVOLVING PICTURES OF YOUNG GIRLS FOUND IN RESPONDENT'S BIBLE AT MENDOTA, INAPPROPRIATE SEXUAL REMARKS AND INAPPROPRIATE SEXUAL CONDUCT.
V. THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THE ALLEGA-TION IN THE PETITION THAT RE-SPONDENT WAS WITHIN 90 DAYS OF DISCHARGE OR RELEASE.
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY DENIED THE DEFENSE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT AS THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE ADDUCED THAT A JUVENILE INCEST OFFENDER WAS SUBSTANTIALLY LIKELY TO SEXUAL-LY VIOLENTLY REOFFEND.
VII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE STATE TO ASK DR. DOREN WITHOUT FOUNDATION A HYPOTHETICAL ABOUT IF PICTURES OF YOUNG GIRLS FOUND IN NATHAN LALOR'S POSSESSION WERE FOR PURPOSES OF SEXUAL AROUSAL, COULD HIS OPINION ABOUT WHETHER RESPONDENT WAS A SEXUALLY VIOLENT PERSON CHANGE.
VIII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY DENIED THE RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO CHANGE ANSWERS AS THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT ADHD, CONDUCT DISORDER OR ANTISOCIAL PERSONALITY DISORDER WERE MENTAL DISORDERS THAT PRE-DISPOSED A JUVENILE INCEST OFFENDER TO ACTS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE.
IX. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING A HEARSAY DIS-POSITIONAL REPORT BY MATHEW KAESERMAN AT TRIAL, WHICH WAS NOT TESTED BY CROSS-EXAM-INATION.
X. THE STATE HAD THE BURDEN OF PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT, WHICH IT FAILED TO SUSTAIN AT THE DISPOSITIONAL HEARING.
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In re the Commitment of Matthew A.B.:
State v. Matthew A.B., 98-0229, __ Wis. 2d __ (Ct. App. )
I. THE RECORD DOES NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT THE PROBABLE CAUSE HEARING WAS HELD WITHIN 72 HOURS OF FILING THE PETITION, AND THEREFORE THE ORDER SHOULD BE VACATED AND THE PETITION DISMISSED.
II. THE TRIAL COURT LOST COMPETENCY WHEN IT FAILED TO HOLD THE TRIAL WITHIN 45 DAYS OF THE PROBABLE CAUSE HEARING. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO MOVE TO DISMISS ON THAT BASIS.
III. THE COURT SHOULD VACATE THE COMMITMENT ORDER AND DISMISS THE PETITION BECAUSE OF THE ERRONEOUS ADMISSION OF MATTHEW A. B.'S JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ADJUDICATION. TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO PROPERLY PRESERVE THIS ISSUE FOR APPEAL CONSTITUTED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
IV. THE CHAPTER 980 COMMITMENT STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED IN THIS CASE BECAUSE MATTHEW A. B.'S DIAGNOSIS OF CONDUCT DISORDER IS TOO IMPRECISE A CATEGORY TO PASS SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS MUSTER. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO RAISE THIS CLAIM.
V. THE CHAPTER 980 COMMITMENT STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED IN THIS CASE BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE SHOWED THAT THERE IS CURRENTLY NO REASONABLE BASIS FOR PREDICTING SEXUAL DANGEROUSNESS IN JUVENILES. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO RAISE THIS CLAIM.
VI. MATTHEW A. B.'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED BY THE COURT'S RELIANCE ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION WIS JI-CRIMINAL 2502 BECAUSE IT FAILS TO DEFINE THE TERM "SUBSTANTIALLY PROBABLE." TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO PROPERLY PRESERVE THIS ISSUE FOR APPEAL.
VII. MATTHEW A. B.'S EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED BY THE COURT'S RELIANCE ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION WIS JI -CRIMINAL 2502 BECAUSE IT FAILS TO DEFINE THE TERM "SUBSTANTIALLY PROBABLE" AS "EXTREMELY LIKELY." TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO PROPERLY PRESERVE THIS ISSUE FOR APPEAL.
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In re the Detention of Frederick L. Pharm:
State v. Pharm, 98-1542
I. THE FILING OF A CH. 980 PETITION ON THE INMATE'S MANDATORY RE-LEASE DATE IS UNTIMELY UNDER BOLLIG, REQUIRING DISMISSAL WITH THE QUESTION OF THE ABILITY OF THE STATE TO REFILE WITHIN 90 DAYS OF DISCHARGE REMAINING AN OPEN QUESTION.
II. INDECENT BEHAVIOR WITH A CHILD AS IT EXISTED IN THE STATUTES OF 1973-74 BEFORE BEING REPEALED WAS NOT A SEXUALLY VIOLENT OFFENSE THAT COULD SERVE AS A PREDICATE OFFENSE FOR A CH. 980 PROSECUTION.
III. THERE WAS NON-COMPLIANCE WITH WIS. STAT. §§ 980.015 AND 980.02, IN THIS CASE AND THE PETITION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED.
IV. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO OBJECT TO TESTI-MONY BY DR. DENNIS DOREN THAT FREDERICK PHARM WAS not credible IN NUMEROUS RESPECTS IN HIS STATEMENTS ABOUT PRIOR CRIMIHNAL EVENTS AND SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND SHOULD NOT BE BELIEVED AND THAT HIS EX-WIFE, MAXINE, WAS CREDIBLE.
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFEC-TIVE FOR NOT ADDRESSING ISSUES CONCERNING "SUBSTANTIAL PROBABILITY" BECAUSE ZANELLI DID NOT REQUIRE A DEFINITION WITHOUT HOLDING A REQUIRED HEARING ON THE CLAIM.
VI. THE FILING OF A CH. 980 PETITION IN A CRIMINAL CASE NUMBER DID NOT CONSTITUTE THE FILING OF A CIVIL ACTION AND DEPRIVED THE TRIAL COURT OF COMPETENCY TO PROCEED.
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State v. Rachel, 98-2074
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER COMPELLING APPELLANT TO PRODUCE HIS COURT APPOINTED EXPERT FOR A DEPOSITION ALONG WITH ANY NOTES, RECORDINGS, WRITINGS, AND REPORTS PREPARED BY HIS EXPERT CONCERNING THE CASE, COMPROMISES APPELLANT'S STATUTORY AND DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO AN APPOINTED EXPERT, UNDERMINES APPELLANT'S RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS, EQUAL PROTECTION, EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, AND THE OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS GRANTED UNDER CHAPTER 980, INFRINGES UPON THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT AND WORK PRODUCT PRIVILEGES, AND EXCEEDS THE COURT'S AUTHORITY UNDER THE DISCOVERY STATUTES.
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State v. Sanders, 99-2081-CR
I. THE STATE WAS REQUIRED TO PROVE AT TRIAL THAT THE APPELLANT WAS WITHIN 90 DAYS OF HIS RELEASE OR DISCHARGE AS ALLEGED PURSUANT TO WIS. STAT. § 980.02(2).
II. THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE RESPONDENT WAS WITHIN 90 DAYS OF HIS RELEASE FROM PRISON AT THE TIME THE PETITION WAS FILED.
III. THE RESPONDENT DID NOT WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO OBJECT TO THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE BY RAISING HIS OBJECTION FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.
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In re the Commitment of Gerald Sanders:
State v. Sanders, 99-2434
I. THE STATE WAS REQUIRED TO PROVE AT TRIAL THAT THE APPELLANT WAS WITHIN 90 DAYS OF HIS RELEASE OR DISCHARGE AS ALLEGED PURSUANT TO WIS. STAT. § 980.02(2).
II. THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE RESPONDENT WAS WITHIN 90 DAYS OF HIS RELEASE FROM PRISON AT THE TIME THE PETITION WAS FILED.
III. THE RESPONDENT DID NOT WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO OBJECT TO THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE BY RAISING HIS OBJECTION FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.
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In re the Commitment of John T. Shaw:
State v. Shaw, 98-1396
I. THE MEANING OF "SUBSTANTIALLY PROBABLE" IN SEC. 980.01(7), STATS., ON THE ELEMENT OF DANGEROUSNESS IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE.
II. THE POST-TRIAL DEFINITION OF "SUBSTANTIALLY PROBABLE" AS MEANING MERELY "MORE LIKELY THAN NOT" WAS ERRONEOUS AND EVIDENCE BASED THEREON INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A FINDING THAT JOHN SHAW WAS A SEXUALLY VIOLENT PERSON.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS WHERE THE RECORD FAILED TO SHOW EITHER A REFERRAL FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS OR A DECLINATION ON THE PART OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE TO FILE A CH. 980 PETITION.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE PETITION BECAUSE IT WAS IMPERMISSIBLY BASED ON PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL IN-FORMATION.
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY REFUSED TO STRIKE THE TESTIMONY OF DR. MARGARET ALEXANDER SINCE HER TESTIMONY WAS IMPROPERLY BASED ON CONFIDEN-TIAL INFORMATION.
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY DENIED RESPONDENT'S CONFIDENTIALITY, HEARSAY, PRIVILEGE AND CONFRONTATION OBJECTIONS TO THE RECEIPT OF 1985 AND 1988 PRE-SENTENCE REPORTS.
VII. CHAPTER 980 VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION AND IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY PUNITIVE BECAUSE ITS RESTRICTIVE POST-COMMITMENT RELEASE PROVISIONS ARE IN-CONSISTENT WITH THOSE FOR OTHER CIVIL COMMITTEES.
VIII. THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE FINDING THAT JOHN SHAW WAS A SEXUALLY VIOLENT PERSON WHERE HE WAS ALMOST 66 YEARS OLD AT THE TIME OF TRIAL AND HIS LIKELIHOOD TO SEXUALLY REOFFEND WAS NOT SHOWN IN TERMS OF LIFE EXPECTANCY.
IX. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, JOHN SHAW SHOULD BE GIVEN A NEW TRIAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE BECAUSE WHETHER HE IS SUBSTANTIALLY PROBABLE TO REOFFEND HAS NOT BEEN FULLY TRIED.
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In re the Commitment of Kenneth A. Volden:
State v. Volden, 99-0667
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND DEPRIVED THE APPELLANT OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN IT REFUSED THE APPELLANT'S REQUST TO DEFINE "SUBSTANTIALLY PROBABLE" FOR THE JURY.
II. WITHOUT "EXTREMELY LIKELY" AS THE DEFINITION OF "SUBSTANTIALLY PROBABLE," CHAPTER 980 VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE UNITED STATES AND WISCONSIN CONSTITUTIONS.
III. THE STATE'S PROOF WAS DEFICIENT BECAUSE IT FAILED TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT, AS REQUIRED BY WIS. STATS. §§ 980.02(2)(AG) AND 980.05(3)(A), THAT THE APPELLANT WAS WITHIN 90 DAYS OF DISCHARGE OR RELEASE.
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In re the Commitment of Ricky D. Loret:
State v. Loret, 99-0104
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO STRIKE JUROR COLES FOR CAUSE AFTER SHE EXPRESSED UNCERTAINTY CONCERNING HER ABILITY TO SET ASIDE HER FEELINGS REGARDING THE SEXUAL ASSAULT OF HER NEPHEW, AND DECIDE THE RESPONDENT'S CASE BASED SOLELY ON THE TESTIMONY PRESENTED.
II. THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE PETITION.
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In re the Commitment of Charles Patterson:
State v. Patterson, 99-1205
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE THE APPELLANT'S JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS AND RECORDS FROM HIS JUVENILE COURT PROCEEDINGS.
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In The Matter Of The Commitment Under Chap. 980, Stats. Of Wilbert L. Thomas:
State v. Thomas, 00-0150
THE STATE HAS NO AUTHORITY TO FILE A CH. 980 PETITION AFTER THOMAS WAS DISCHARGED FROM SERVICE OF THE SENTENCE IMPOSED FOR HIS CONVCITION FOR A SEXUALLY VIOLENT OFFENSE.
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In Re The Commitment Of Harris D. Byers:
State v. Byers, 99-2441 & 00-0454
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION TO TAKE A PLEA IN A CH. 980 CASE.
II. IF THE COURT COULD PROPERLY ENTERTAIN A PLEA IN THIS CASE, RESPONDENT'S PLEA WAS INVOLUNTARY.
III. HARRIS D. BYERS WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHEN HIS ADMISSION TO BEING A SEXUALLY VIOLENT PERSON UNDER CH. 980 DURING HIS JURY TRIAL WAS PREMISED ON COUNSEL'S UNEQUIVOCAL AND ERRONEOUS ADVICE HE WOULD BE PRESERVING A CLAIM FOR APPEAL THAT THE CASE WAS NOT PROPERLY REFERRED FOR INSTITUTION FO THE PROCEEDINGS MAKING HIS ADMISSION UNKNOWING AND INVOLUNTARY. IV. IF THIS COURT FINDS THIS ISSUE IS ONE OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION NOT WAIVED BY RESPONDENT'S PLEA OR SOMEHOW DETERMINES THE MERITS, MR. BEYERS IS STILL ENTITLED TO RELIEF BECAUSE THE BROWN COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY DID NOT HAVE PLENARY AUTHORITY TO FILE A PETITION FOR COMMITMENT UNDER WIS. STAT. CH. 980, THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S AUTHORITY IS LIMITED TO THOSE CASES IN WHICH THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS HAS CERTIFIED AN INDIVIDUAL AS ELIGIBLE FOR CH. 980 PROCEEDINGS, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE HAS DECLINED TO FILE THE PETITION FOR COMMITMENT.
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In Re The Commitment Of Alan Michael Wiedenhoeft:
State v. Wiedenhoeft, 99-2379
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE COMPETENCY TO PROCEED CONCERNING THE UNTIMELY CH. 980 PETITION FILED IN THIS CASE.
II. THE TRIAL COURT UNCONSTITUTION-ALLY APPLIED CH. 980 TO RESPONDENT IN CONCLUDING THAT THE RELEVANT STATUTES DO NOT REQUIRE THE RELEASE OF A PERSON WHO HAS ESSENTIALLY COM-PLETED TREATMENT.
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THERE IS NO EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AS TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SEX OFFENDER TREATMENT GENERALLY OR AS TO RESPONDENT PARTICULARLY OPERATED TO TAKE A FACT ISSUE FROM CONSIDERATION AND MADE CH. 980 UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED.
IV. THE FAILURE OF THE STATE TO PROVE THAT THE CH. 980 PETITION HEREIN SHOULD BE TIMELY FILED SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY STATE V. THIEL PENDING IN THE WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT.
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In Re The Interest Of Joseph E.G.,
State v. Joseph E.G., 99-3248
AS APPLIED TO THE FACTS IN THIS CASE, THE EXCEPTION TO THE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION STATUE VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE UNITED STATES AND WISCONSIN CONSTITUTIONS BECAUSE IT ARBITRARILY AND IRRATIONALLY PROHIBITS INDIVIDUALS CONVICTED OF FALSE IMPRISONMENT FROM APPLYING FOR THE EXCEPTION.
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In Re The Commitment Of Richard A. Brown:
State v. Brown, 99-0635
I. THIS COURT SHOULD ORDER A NEW TRIAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, BECAUSE OF THE COMPLETE CONFUSION AND THE MULTITUDE OF ERRORS COMMITTED BY THE EXPERT WITNESSES, THE TRIAL ATTORNEYS AND THE TRIAL JUDGE CONCERNING THE PROPER STANDARD FOR COMMITMENT UNDER THE "SUBSTANTIAL PROBABILITY" LANGUAGE FOUND IN SECTION 980.02(2)(c).
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO STRIKE JUROR HEDRINGTON FOR CAUSE, AND BROWN WAS PREJUDICED BY BEING FORCED TO USE ONE OF HIS PEREMPTORY STRIKES TO CORRECT THE COURT'S ERROR.
III. THE COURT FAILED TO INSTRUCT AND THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE THE ESSENTIAL STATUTORY ELEMENT THAT BROWN WAS WITHIN 90 DAYS OF RELEASE, AS REQUIRED BY SEC. 980.02(2)(ag) AND SEC. 980.05(3)(a).
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In re the Commitment of Lenny P. Keding: State v. Lenny P. Keding, 00-1700
THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER ALTERNATIVES TO REVOCATION.
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State v. Nathan Lalor, 99-0957 (supplemental)
NATHAN LALOR'S CH. 980 COMMITMENT MUST BE VACATED DUE TO A FAILURE OF PROOF WHICH PREVENTS RETRIAL OR OTHER FURTHER PROCEEDINGS ON DOUBLE JEOPARDY GROUNDS.
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State v. August T. Krueger, 00-0152
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE STATE TO WITHDRAW FROM A STIPULATED ORDER FOR CONDITIONAL RELEASE WHEN NO EFFORT HAD BEEN MADE TO CREATE A PROGRAM ONCE THE ORIGINAL RESIDENCE AND EMPLOYMENT PLAN IN MANITOWOC COUNTY WAS FOUND NOT AVAILABLE.
II. THE STATE WAS ESTOPPED FROM MOVING TO DISMISS RESPONDENT'S PETITIONS FOR DISCHARGE AND RELEASE IN 1999 AFTER HAVING TAKEN INCONSISTENT POSITIONS UPON WHICH THE RESPONDENT AND COURT RELIED IN 1997 AND 1998 AGREEING TO A RIGHT TO A TRIAL.
III. TO THE EXTENT THAT RESPONDENT WAS DENIED AN OPPORTUNITY FOR ANY PROCESS, HE WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS AND THE ORDER OF DECEMBER 22, 1999, DENYING DISMISSAL IS VOID.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF AUGUST T. KRUEGER'S CH. 980 PETITION FOR DISCHARGE ON THE BASIS THAT THERE WAS NO PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE HE WAS NO LONGER A SEXUALLY VIOLENT PERSON REFLECTED AN ERRONEOUS UNDERSTANDING OF THE LAW REQUIRING VACATION OF THE ORDER OF MARCH 30, 2000.
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In re the Commitment of Richard Duane Thielman:
State v. Thielman,
00-2156
THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT RICHARD THIELMAN WAS SUBSTANTIALLY LIKELY TO SEXUALLY VIOLENTLY REOFFEND WHEN THE UNREFUTED EVIDENCE SHOWED THAT HIS MEDICATION FOR CANCER REDUCED HIS TESTOSTERONE TO AN UNMEASURABLY LOW LEVEL AND SUPPRESSED HIS SEX DRIVE WHICH MADE SEXUAL REOFFENSE VERY UNLIKELY.
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In re the Commitment of Nathan John Lalor:
State v. Nathan John Lalor (2),
00-0552
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT WHERE RESPONDENT WAS NOT WITHIN 90 DAYS OF RELEASE FROM A JUVENILE INSTITUTION WHERE HE WAS COMMITTED UNDER WIS. STAT. § 938.183 OR 938.34 WHEN THE CH. 980 PETITION WAS FILED WHICH WAS NOT AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
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State v. Beyer, 00-0036 (amended)
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE COMPETENCY TO EXERCISE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION FOR A DETERMINATION ON PROBABLE CAUSE 53 DAYS AFTER A JUDGE HAD BEEN ASSIGNED AFTER SUBSTITUTION.
II. DERYL BEYER'S CH. 980 COMMITMENT MUST BE VACATED DUE TO A FAILURE OF PROOF WHICH PREVENTS RETRIAL OR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS ON DOUBLE JEOPARDY GROUNDS.
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In re the commitment of Deryl B. Beyer:
State v. Beyer,
00-0036
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE COMPETENCY TO EXERCISE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION FOR A DETERMINATION ON PROBABLE CAUSE 53 DAYS AFTER A JUDGE HAD BEEN ASSIGNED AFTER SUBSTITUTION.
II. THE FAILURE OF THE STATE TO PROVE THE SUBSTANTIVE ELEMENT THAT THE WIS. STAT. CH. 980 PETITION WAS TIMELY FILED WITHIN 90 DAYS OF APPELLANT'S RELEASE REQUIRES A DISMISSAL UNDER THE RATIONALE OF STATE V. THIEL PENDING IN THE WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT.
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In re the Commitment of John Lee Laxton:
State v. Laxton,
99-3164
I. CHAPTER 980 VIOLATES DUE PROCESS BECAUSE IT PERMITS AN INVOLUNTARY, INDEFINITE CIVIL COMMITMENT WITHOUT THE CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED PREDICATE THAT THE PERSON SUFFERS FROM A SERIOUS MENTAL DISORDER THAT MAKES IT SERIOUSLY DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO CONTROL HIS DANGEROUS BEHAVIOR.
II. ALTERNATIVELY, THE JUDGMENT MUST BE VACATED BECAUSE THE JURY IN-STRUCTIONS, IN VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS, DID NOT REQUIRE A FINDING THAT MR. LAXTON HAD A SERIOUS MENTAL DISORDER THAT MADE IT SERIOUSLY DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO CONTROL HIS DANGEROUS BEHAVIOR.
III. A NEW TRIAL IS NECESSARY IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE BECAUSE THE REAL CON-TROVERSY, NAMELY, WHETHER MR. LAXTON IS A SEXUALLY DANGEROUS PERSON, WAS NOT FULLY AND FAIRLY TRIED.
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