¶14      The IAD is an interstate compact that prescribes "procedures by which a member State may obtain for trial a prisoner incarcerated in another member jurisdiction and by which the prisoner may demand the speedy disposition of certain charges pending against him in another jurisdiction." State v. Eesley, 225 Wis.  2d 248, 254, 591 N.W.2d 846 (1999) (quoting United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 343 (1978)). Both Wisconsin and Nevada are party states to the IAD. The IAD is set out in Wis. Stat. § 976.05 and Nev. Rev. Stat. § 178.620 (2005). The IAD aids in efficient prosecution of crimes and it removes uncertainties that obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation by clarifying prisoner status. § 976.05(1).

¶15      The IAD is a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact within the meaning of the Compact Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. I, § 10, cl. 3, "and thus is a federal law subject to federal construction." Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 719 (1985) (citing Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438-442 (1981)). Therefore, in order to accord more consistency with the IAD interpretations of other federal and state courts, we may employ federal rules of construction in interpreting Wis. Stat. § 976.05.

¶24      Furthermore, the language of the IAD is clear and unambiguous. The IAD applies to detainers lodged against prisoners that are based on untried indictments, informations or complaints. … There is nothing in the IAD that indicates that the rights accorded to prisoners under it attach when there are no untried charges outstanding. Therefore, we conclude that under the plain language of the statute, a prisoner has the following rights after he or she files a Request for Disposition under Article III (§ 976.05(3)): (1) transportation to a receiving state to answer pending charges; (2) commencement of a trial within 180 days in the receiving state; (3) return to the sending state to complete the prisoner's term of incarceration; and (4) upon completion of the prisoner's term of incarceration in the sending state, return to the receiving state to serve any term of incarceration that has been imposed there.

¶25      Pharm also argues that his Nevada parole is "imprisonment," as that term is used in the IAD. Imprisonment is not defined in the IAD. Therefore, it is defined according to its common meaning. Perrin, 444 U.S. at 42 (stating that unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their common meaning) (citation omitted)). Federal courts have defined imprisonment as "that definable period of time during which a prisoner must be confined in order to complete or satisfy the prison term or sentence which has been ordered." United States v. Dobson, 585 F.2d 55, 58-59 (3rd Cir. 1978) (emphasis in original); see also United States v. Reed, 620 F.2d 709, 711 (9th Cir. 1980) (concluding a person on parole is not imprisoned under the IAD).

…

¶27      In addition, if the definition of imprisonment under the IAD were interpreted to include both actual confinement and extended supervision or parole, a prisoner sentenced to parole for life in a sending state would remain indefinitely in the sending state and would never be eligible to serve his or her sentence in the receiving state. This result is not in accord with the plain language of the IAD. State ex rel. Otterstetter v. McManus, 243 N.W.2d 730, 732-33 (Minn. 1976). ^[11]

¶17 Any IAD violation was the fault of Illinois, not Wisconsin. In light of this, we believe the extreme remedy of dismissing the Wisconsin charge against Townsend, which is not specifically mandated by the IAD, is not appropriate. We understand the appellant’s frustration with the Illinois prison system’s ineptness that led to a clear violation of the IAD, but the State of Wisconsin did not violate the IAD, and Townsend clearly knew of the Wisconsin charge and chose not to waive extradition and seek a quick resolution. ^[3] Under these circumstances, it would be contrary to public policy to permit Townsend to escape prosecution on the crime he committed in Wisconsin.

¶18 Further, although Townsend contends that the IAD violation prevented him from seeking prompt resolution of the Wisconsin charge so that he could have requested concurrent sentences, he does not allege that he was actually prejudiced by any violation. Namely, he does not assert that for some reason because of the delay he was unable to mount a defense to the Wisconsin charge. Accordingly, Townsend has failed to establish that he was prejudiced by Illinois’ failure to comply with the IAD. See State v. Russo, 70 Wis. 2d 169, 177-78, 233 N.W.2d 485 (1975). ^[4]

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^[3] We held in State v. Miller, 2003 WI App 74, ¶11, 261 Wis. 2d 866, 661 N.W.2d 466, that the rights provided by the IAD may be waived. Waiver applies whether or not the defendant is aware of the IAD provisions when the defendant requests treatment inconsistent with IAD’s provisions. Id.

^[4] The trial court, in its order, addressed the issue of whether Townsend’s speedy trial right had been violated under the circumstances of this case. The trial court concluded that the right had not been violated. We agree with the trial court’s analysis in that regard. Townsend does not specifically challenge this portion of the trial court’s order and therefore, we decline to address it further.

¶7        The Rule of Specialty generally requires that an extradited defendant be tried for the crimes on which extradition has been granted, and none other. United States v. Van Cauwenberghe, 827 F.2d 424, 428 (9th Cir. 1987). The enforcement of the rule is founded primarily on international comity. United States v. Thirion, 813 F.2d 146, 151 (8th Cir. 1987). The requesting court must “live up to whatever promises it made in order to obtain extradition” because preservation of the institution of extradition requires the continuing cooperation of the surrendering state. United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir. 1986). Because the doctrine is grounded in international comity rather than in some right of the defendant, the Rule of Specialty may be waived by the asylum state.  Id.

…

 ¶9        In the final analysis then, the inquiry into the Rule of Specialty comes down to whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the court in the requesting state reasonably believes that prosecuting the defendant on particular charges contradicts the surrendering state’s manifest intentions. See United States  v. Cuevas, 847 F.2d 1417, 1427-28 (9th Cir. 1988). Phrased another way, the question is whether the surrendering state would deem the conduct for which the requesting state actually prosecutes the defendant as interconnected with (as opposed to independent from) the acts for which he was extradited. See id. 

¶13      The IAD is a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact under the Compact Clause of the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 10, Clause 3. Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 442 (1981); see also State v. Grzelak, 215 Wis.  2d 577, 580, 573 N.W.2d 538 (Ct. App. 1997). Wisconsin is a party to the Agreement pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 976.05. Grzelak, 215 Wis.  2d at 580. While the rights under the IAD are statutory, State v. Miller, 2003 WI App 74, ¶9, 261 Wis. 2d 866, 661 N.W.2d 466, they have the force of federal law. Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 442.

Based on Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716 (1985), we hold that the IAD does not apply to a parolee. (¶) … Carchman dealt with a probationer, but we can discern no reason why the same result would not apply to a parolee. If probation status or an allegation of a probation violation does not constitute an “untried indictment, information or complaint” under the IAD, it logically follows that the same must be said of parole status or an allegation of a parole violation.

¶10. The State does not dispute that it failed to bring Lewis's case to trial within 120 days after the district attorney's office received his request for prompt disposition of his case. …

¶11. The statute mandates that when the case is not brought to trial within 120 days, it "shall be dismissed" unless the defendant escapes or otherwise prevents the trial from taking place. Here, two factors influenced the trial court's decision to reschedule the trial: the court's crowded trial calendar for the week of September 30, and the prosecutor's vacation plans. Either of these factors may be an appropriate reason to reschedule a trial within the statutory time limit; however, they do not justify violating a defendant's statutory right to prompt disposition under the IDA.

¶12. The State argues, however, that Lewis waived his right to a prompt disposition at the September 11, 2002 pretrial conference ….

…

¶14. The trial court held that Lewis had an "affirmative responsibility" to advise the court of his prompt disposition request. We cannot agree because no such duty exists in the statute. Further, we cannot conclude that Lewis's attorney, his third attorney on this case, waived Lewis's statutory right to prompt disposition by stating the rescheduled trial date was "fine." Waiver of a statutory right must be an intentional and voluntary relinquishment of a known right, and it must be accomplished by a clear and specific renunciation of that right. Mulvaney v. Tri State Truck & Auto Body, Inc., 70 Wis. 2d 760, 768, 235 N.W.2d 460 (1975). Lewis's attorney acquiesced to the rescheduled trial date only after the prosecutor indicated, incorrectly, that no request for prompt disposition had been filed. This is not an intentional and voluntary relinquishment of a known right. We are troubled by Lewis's absence from the pretrial hearing and observe that, had he been present, the issue of whether a request for prompt disposition had been filed could have been immediately, and accurately, resolved.³

¶15. We conclude that the trial court misplaced the responsibility for complying with the 120-day time limit on Lewis when it imposed an "affirmative responsibility" on him to advise the court of his properly submitted request. Once the district attorney receives the request, the responsibility for prompt disposition is placed squarely on the district attorney. Wis. Stat. § 971.11(1), (2). We hold that the trial court erred when it failed to dismiss the case in accordance with the mandate of § 971.11(7). We reverse and remand the case and direct the trial court to determine whether dismissal will be with or without prejudice. See Davis, 248 Wis. 2d 986, ¶29.

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³ The trial court explained Lewis's absence from the pretrial hearing as follows: "We don't have the defendant here. He is in custody, and we were in the middle of a suppression hearing with two other in-custodies, so we are short of transport people." From this we gather that Lewis would have been there but for transportation issues. It is not explained, however, why Lewis could not have participated by telephone.

¶14. We agree with the court of appeals that ‘the legislature has left the matter up to the courts to exercise its [sic] discretion to dismiss with prejudice in a proper case lest the statute have no meaning at all.’ This interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 971.11(7) granting a circuit court the discretion to dismiss a criminal case with or without prejudice best serves the legislative purposes: First, this interpretation comports with the legislature's goal to prevent ‘the potential injustices resulting from the practice of filing detainers.’ Second, it comports with the legislature's objective to give an inmate ‘a greater degree of knowledge about his [or her] future [so that he or she] could begin more constructive planning and co-operate on a treatment program with the knowledge his [or her] efforts would not be minimized by the threat of unsatisfied charges.’ Third, it comports with the ‘legislative intent to provide the operation of a speedier disposition for inmates than for others charged with crimes.’ Fourth, it comports with the legislative purpose to prevent the State from repeatedly dismissing and refiling a criminal case after a dismissal without prejudice, rendering the 120-day time period set forth in § 971.11(2) a nullity. ‘The proper control of continued refiling of charges by the State is the authority of the courts to dismiss with prejudice.’ We further agree with the court of appeals that to interpret § 971.11(7) as requiring dismissal of a criminal case only without prejudice would deprive an inmate of prompt disposition of the case, which is the very purpose of § 971.11.

¶12. This court has found that rights under the Detainer Act "are statutory in nature and may be waived by a defendant's request for a procedure inconsistent with its provisions." Brown, 118 Wis. 2d at 386. By firing his lawyer six days before the scheduled start of trial and twenty-eight days before the expiration of the time period, Miller requested such a procedure. ...

¶14. Alternatively, Miller argues that even if he did waive his rights under the IAD, he only waived them for the time up until his last scheduled November trial date. He argues that even if his action tolled the time limits of the IAD from July 3, 2001, to November 2001, the State still failed to try him in a timely manner. However, he cites no authority for the proposition that rights to a speedy trial can kick in after they have been waived. The law is that a defendant "cannot be heard to complain about delay caused by his own conduct," and that such conduct "need not be called delaying tactics to be identified as time consuming impediments to an early trial." Norwood v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 343, 357, 246 N.W.2d 801 (1976). Having asked for, and accepted, treatment inconsistent with his rights under the IAD, the defendant cannot then assert those rights in an effort to win dismissal of charges.

¶8; ... we conclude that rights granted under the anti-shuttling provision of the IAD are statutory in nature and may be waived if the prisoner requests a procedure inconsistent with the statute’s provisions....

¶9; Turning to the facts of this case, we conclude that Nonahal affirmatively requested to be treated in a manner contrary to WIS. STAT. § 976.05(4)(e), the anti-shuttling provision of the IAD, and that his request constituted a waiver of these rights.